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1 Introduction
Bucci (2005) studies the impact of competition in the intermediate goods
sector on growth. He uses the Gancia and Zilibotti (2005) model in which he
introduces a different assumption concerning the production of intermediate
goods. Indeed, unlike Gancia and Zilibotti (2005) which assumes that one
need one unit of final good to produce one unit of intermediate good, Bucci
(2005) does the hypothesis that the firm has to use one unit of labor. This
assumption which is called ”resource allocation effect” implies that labor
can be allocated between three sectors : final good, intermediate goods and
research. The interplay between this effect and the traditional Schumpeterian
effect allows to obtain an interesting result. Indeed, Bucci (2005) finds an
inverted-U relationship between competition and growth. For low value of
competition, more competition is beneficial to growth since it allows a better
allocation of resource without hampering that much innovations incentives.
In this case, the resource allocation effect is bigger than the profit incentive
effect. On the other hand, for high value of competition, more competition
reduces strongly growth because of the reduction of profit. In this case, the
profit incentive effect is bigger than the resource allocation effect.
Among the assumptions used by Bucci (2005) to derive this result is that
there are no difference between the intermediate goods share in final output,
the returns to specialization and the degree of market power of monopolistic
competitors. This leads to the natural question whether making such a
difference to the model changes its predictions. In this note, we show that
including this difference into the model developed by Bucci (2005) eliminates
the result mentioned above.
2 The model
The model developed is based on Bucci (2005).2 The economy is struc-
tured by three sectors : final good sector, intermediate goods sector and
R&D sector. The final output sector produces output that can be used for
consumption using labor and intermediate goods. These are available in A
varieties and are produced by employing only labor. The R&D sector creates
the blueprints for new varieties of intermediate goods which are produced by
employing labor and knowledge. These blueprints are sold to the intermedi-
ate goods sector.
2We use the notations of Bucci (2005) in order to have a direct comparison with his
model.
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2.1 The final goods sector
In this sector atomistic producers engage in perfect competition. The fi-
nal goods sector produces a composite good Y by using all the jth type of
intermediate goods xj and labor LY .
3 Production is given by :
Y = Nγ−λ(1/α−1)
[∫ N
0
xαj dj
] λ
α
L1−λY , (1)
where α ∈ [0, 1], λ ∈ [0, 1], γ ∈ ]0, 1[ are three parameters. This production
function allow us to disentangle the degree of market power of monopolistic
competitors in the intermediate sector ( 1
α
− 1), the intermediate goods share
in final output (λ) and the degree of returns from specialization (γ).4 In
this sense, this model is a generalization of Bucci (2005) and Benassy (1998)
models.5 If we normalize to one the price of the final goods, the profit of the
representative firm is given by :
piY = N
γ−λ(1/α−1)
[∫ N
0
xαj dj
] λ
α
L1−λY −
∫ N
0
pjxjdj − wYLY , (2)
where wY is the wage rate in the final good sector and pj is the price of the
jth intermediate good. Under perfect competition in the final output market
and the factor inputs markets, the representative firm chooses intermediate
goods and labor in order to maximize its profit taking prices as given and
subject to its technological constraint. The first order conditions are the
followings :
∂piY
∂xj
= λNγ−
λ
α
+λ
[∫ N
0
xαj dj
] λ
α
−1
L1−λY x
α−1
j − pj = 0, (3)
∂piY
∂LY
= (1− λ)Nγ− λα+λ
[∫ N
0
xαj dj
] λ
α
L−λY − wY = 0. (4)
Equation (3) is the inverse demand function for the firm that produces the jth
intermediate good whereas equation (4) characterizes the demand function
of labor.
3Time subscripts are omitted whenever there is no risk of ambiguity.
4Benassy (1996) made a simple modification to the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model
which clearly disentangles taste for variety and market power. At the same time, Benassy
(1998) and de Groot and Nahuis (1998) show that the introduction of this modification in
an endogenous growth model with expanding product variety a` la Grossman and Helpman
(1991) affects the welfare analysis.
5Indeed, we obtain the Bucci (2005) model by introducing the following constraints
λ = α, γ = 1− α in our model. In the same way, by introducing the constraint λ = 1, we
obtain the Benassy (1998) model.
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2.2 The intermediate goods sector
In the intermediate goods sector, producers engage in monopolistic compe-
tition. Each firm produces one horizontally differentiated intermediate good
and have to buy a patented design before producing it. Following Grossman
and Helpman (1991) and Bucci (2005), we assume that each local interme-
diate monopolist has access to the same technology employing only labor lj
:
xj = lj. (5)
We suppose that firms behavior which produce intermediate goods is gov-
erned by the principle of profit maximization at given factor prices under a
technological constraint. The profit function of firms is the following :
pij = pjxj − wjlj, (6)
where wj is wage rate in the intermediate goods. Using the first order con-
dition, we obtain the price of the jth intermediate good :
pj =
wj
α
, (7)
At the symmetric equilibrium, all the firms produce the same quantity of the
intermediate good x, face the same wage rate w and by consequence fix the
same price for their production p. The price is equal to a constant mark up
1
α
over the marginal cost w. Defining by Lj =
∫ N
0
ljdj, the total amount of
labor employed in the intermediate goods sector and under the assumption of
symmetry among intermediate goods producers, we can rewrite the equation
(5) as follows :
xj =
Lj
N
, (8)
Finally, the profit function of the firm which produces the jth intermediate
good is
pij = λ(1− α)Nγ−1LλjL1−λy . (9)
2.3 The R&D sector
There are competitive research firms undertaking R&D. Following Romer
(1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991), we assume that new blueprints
are produced using old blueprints N and an amount of R&D labor LN :
∂N
∂t
=
1
η
NLN , (10)
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where 1
η
> 0 represents the productivity of the R&D process. Because of the
perfect competition in the R&D sector, we can obtain the real wage in this
sector as a function of the profit flows associated to the latest intermediate
in using the zero profit condition :
wNLN =
∂N
∂t
PN , (11)
where wN represents the real wage earned by R&D labor. PN is the real
value of such a blueprint which is equal to :
PN =
∫ ∞
t
pije
−r(τ−t)dτ, τ > t, (12)
where r is the real interest rate. Given PN , the free entry conditions leads
to :
wN =
NPN
η
. (13)
2.4 The consumer behavior
The demand side is characterized by the representative household who con-
sumes and supplies labor. Following Grossman and Helpman (1991), we
assume that the utility function of this consumer is logarithmic6 :
U =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt log(C)dt, (14)
where C is private consumption, ρ > 0 is the rate of pure time preference.
The representative household is endowed with fixed quantities of labor L that
are supplied inelastically. The flow budget constraint for the household is :
∂W
∂t
= wL+ rW − C, (15)
where W is the total wealth of the agent (measured in units of final good), w
is the wage rate per unit of labor services. From the maximization program
of the consumer, the necessary and sufficient conditions for a solution are
given by the Keynes-Ramsey rule :
gC = r − ρ, (16)
and the transversality condition :
lim
t→∞
µtWt = 0, (17)
where µt is the co-state variable.
6This specification of the utility function does not alter the results.
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3 The equilibrium and the steady state
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium and give some analytical
characterization of a balanced growth path.
3.1 The equilibrium
It is now possible to characterize the labor market equilibrium in the economy
considered. On this market, because of the homogeneity and the perfect
mobility across sectors, the arbitrage ensures that the wage rate that is earned
by salaries which work in the final good sector, intermediate goods sector
or R&D sector is equal. As a result, the following three conditions must
simultaneously be satisfied7 :
L = LY + Lj + LN , (18)
wj = wy, (19)
wj = wN . (20)
Equation (18) is a resource constraint, saying that at any point in the time
the sum of the labor demands coming from each activity must be equal to
the total available fixed supply. Equation (19) and equation (20) state that
the wage earned by one unit of labor is to be the same irrespective of the
sector where that unit of labor is actually employed. We can characterize the
product market equilibrium in the economy considered. Indeed, on this mar-
ket, the firms produce a final good which can be consumed. Consequently,
the following condition must be satisfied :
Y = C. (21)
Equation (21) is a resource constraint on the final goods sector.
3.2 The steady state
At the steady state, all variables as Y , C, N grow at a positive constant
rate. Obviously, it is easy to show from equations (21, 1 and 8) the following
relationship between the economic growth rate, consumption growth rate and
knowledge growth rate :
gY = gC = γgN . (22)
7We assume without loss of commonalty that the total labor force is constant.
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Using the previous equations, we can demonstrate the following steady state
equilibrium values for the relevant variables of the model89 :
r =
L(1− α)γλ− η((α− 1)λγ + γ − 1)ρ
η
, (23)
Lj = αλ(L+ ηρ), (24)
LY = (1− λ)(L+ ηρ), (25)
LN = (1− α)λ(L+ ηρ)− ηρ, (26)
gY =
γ((1− α)λ(L+ ηρ)− ηρ)
η
. (27)
4 The relationship between product market
competition and growth
In this section, we study the long run relationship between competition and
growth in the model presented above. Following most authors, we use the so-
called Lerner Index to gauge the intensity of market power within a market.
Such an index is defined by the ratio of price (P ) minus marginal cost (CM)
over price. Using the definition of a mark up (Markup= P
CM
) and Lerner
Index (LernerIndex=P−CM
P
), we can use (7) to define a proxy of competition
as follows10 :
(1− LernerIndex) = α, (28)
We show that our simple generalization of Bucci (2005)’s model that con-
sists in having the monopolistic mark-up in the intermediate goods sector,
the intermediate goods share in the final output and the returns to special-
ization treated separately, the inverted U relationship between competition
and growth no longer exists.
Proposition 1 The relationship between competition and growth is negative
for all positive values of ρ, η, L, γ ∈ ]0, 1[ and λ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. The proof is obtained by differentiated (27) with respect to α :
∂gY
∂α
= −γλ(L+ ηρ)
η
< 0. (29)
8Results (23) trough (27) are demonstrated in the appendix.
9In order to have a positive growth rate, we assume that 0 < η < Lλ−Lαλαλρ−λρ+ρ .
10This is the same measure of product market competition used by Aghion, Bloom,
Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005), Aghion and Griffith (2005) and Aghion and Howitt
(2005), contrary to Bucci and Parello (2006) which links the competition to two compo-
nents : the input shares in income and the parameter of substitution between intermedi-
ates.
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In order to illustrate this result, we plot equation (27) for different values
of competition (α), and returns to specialization (γ)11 :
Figure 1: Relationship between competition (α), returns to specialization (γ)
and growth (gY )
According to the profit incentive effect, an increase of competition (α) re-
duces the price of the intermediate good and profits, what determines the in-
centives to innovation. Therefore, the profit incentive effect seems to predict
an unambiguously negative relationship between product market competi-
tion and growth along the entire range of competition intensity. Contrary to
Bucci (2005), an increase of competition reduces the amount of labor devoted
to the research sector (LN) along the entire range of competition intensity.
Moreover an increase of competition has no effect on the amount of labor
allocated to the final goods sector (LY ) and increases the amount of labor in
the intermediate goods sector (Lj). This means that the resource allocation
effect seems also to predict an unambiguously negative relationship between
11In drawing Figure 1, we take the same values of parameters as Bucci (2005) in order
to be as close as possible to his model : ρ = 0.03, η = 1, L = 35 and λ = 0.75.
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product market competition and growth. Finally, we always have as we can
see on the above picture a decreasing relationship between competition and
growth.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a generalization of production function of Bucci
(2005) which disentangles the monopolistic mark-up in the intermediate
goods sector, the intermediate goods share in the final output and the returns
to specialization. Our main finding is that the result of his model that close
in an inverted U relationship between competition and growth depends crit-
ically on the assumptions that there are no differences between these three
parameters. Indeed, for all values of parameters except to λ = α, we could
remove the inverted-U relationship between competition and growth. This
result is due to the interplay of two effects : Schumpeterian and resource
allocation effects. In our model, we find that the resource allocation effect is
always negative which reinforces the Schumpeterian effect on growth. Conse-
quently, we find a decreasing relationship between competition and growth.
Appendix
In these appendix, we describe the way followed in order to obtain the main
results of this paper (23 through 27). Using the equations (3, 4, 7, 8 and 19),
we obtain :
LY =
(1− λ)Lj
αλ
. (30)
Plugging this equation into equation (18) yields :
Lj =
αλ(L− LN)
1 + (α− 1)λ. (31)
Consequently, the equation (30) can be re-written as :
LY =
(1− λ)(L− LN)
1 + (α− 1)λ . (32)
In order to compute the wage in the research sector, we need to have the
value of the blueprint in the steady state (equations 9 and 12) which is :
PN =
(1− α)λL1−λY LλjNγ−1
(1−γ)LN
η
+ r
. (33)
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Given PN and using equation (13), we obtain :
wN =
NγLλjL
1−λ
Y (1− α)λ
LN(1− γ) + rη . (34)
In equating wj to wN , we find :
Lj =
α(LN(1− γ) + rη)
1− α . (35)
Using the equations (31 and 35), we obtain :
LN =
L(1− α)λ− rη(1 + (α− 1)λ)
1− γ(1 + (α− 1)λ) . (36)
Consequently :
Lj =
α(L(1− γ) + rη)λ)
1− γ + (1− α)λγ . (37)
In order to determine the equilibrium interest rate, we use these two equations
:
gY = gC = r − ρ, (38)
gY = γgN , (39)
After some computations, we obtain :
r =
L(1− α)γλ− η((α− 1)λγ + γ − 1)ρ
η
. (40)
Finally, from the previous equations, we obtain all the other variables of the
model :
Lj = αλ(L+ ηρ), (41)
LY = (1− λ)(L+ ηρ), (42)
LN = ηρ+ (1− α)λ(L+ ηρ), (43)
gY =
γ((1− α)λ(L+ ηρ)− ηρ)
η
. (44)
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